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The present research paper, entitled “Concern for Future 
Generations: Some Perspectives” begins with revisiting a 
number of ideas related with the future dressed 
generations from the perspective of Environmental Ethics. 
One of the scholarly works which I have addressed here: 
Work by Gregory S.Kavka who has explained the 
problem of future generations in the essay, “The Paradox of 
Future Individuals”. Moreover, I have tried to highlight the 
view points where the scholars been addressed, 
fundamentally coincide and differ from each other. In the 
concluding part of the paper I have brought into focus 
'the Buddhist theory of kamma and how the actions 
performed by individuals have an impact on future 
generations. I have shown how the actions of an 
individual in the present may address our concerns about 
the future generations. Does kamma legitimize concern for 
the future generations?  
My work procedure has remained qualitative in nature 
and my remarks are both descriptive and critical of the 
works.  
Introduction and Literature Review 
No one can deny the fact that we will observe varied human 
reactions when the question of concern for the future generations 
arises. I will be analyzing a number of human attitudes towards the  
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future generations. My exploration in this area will start with an 
analysis of different perspectives of philosophers in this area. The 
commonly observed tendency is to perform all duties towards 
one‟s own self, family, nation, and when considered from a broader 
perspective performing global duties at large. I will be exploring 
the obligations which “we” (present generation) have towards our 
future generations and will try to shed some light on the whole 
picture based on intergenerational relationship.1 
Caring for one‟s own self of all is not unjustified. One has to take 
care of one‟s individual requirements in order to have a contended 
life. The problem arises when we are faced with the question of 
concern for our future generations. The problem originates when 
an individual has to make a choice between his own well being and 
the well being of the future generations.  
It is generally believed that the minimal demands of an individual 
includes his need for food (to fulfill his appetite), air (to breath), 
water (to quench his thirst) which universally remains the same 
irrespective of his membership to any generation (past, present, 
future). The existing individuals do not need to sacrifice anything 
for the future generations; it is a matter of legitimate concern which 
the present generation needs to have for their future generations. 
This essay will analyze the possible reasons behind this act of 
concern which is expected out of the present generation.  
There already exists a section of population who is of the opinion 
that the present generation need not take into account the well 
being of the future generations, since they owe them nothing. In 
other words a section of the presently existing population believes 
that they are living their lives just for themselves most importantly 
of all and thereby they do have the right to live it in their own 
terms (Some individuals even have a rather radical attitude 
towards future generations, to the extent that they might worsen 
the lives of the future generations.).  
                                                          
1 Avner De Shalit has dealt with the concern for the future generations 
justifying their claim on intergenerational relationship. In this essay I will 
be dealing in great detail with De Shalit‟s point of view which is known as 
the communitarian approach. 




There are primarily three set of behaviors observed in the present 
individuals towards their future generations. They are as follows: 
 They (a part of the present generation) just do not care 
about the future generations. They are solely concerned 
about themselves and their individual well-being in an 
isolated manner. 
 One part of the present generation feels that the needs 
of the future generations might be completely different 
from the presently existing ones. As a result of the 
difference in tastes and preferences, they believe that it 
is just not possible for the present generation to 
determine the demands of the future generations. 
 The third set of present generation is concerned for the 
future generation but their concern is only meant for 
the immediate future generations. They really do not 
care for the well being of the distant future 
generations. 
By the end of this short account on the concern for the future 
generations my aim is to reach a tenable conclusion related with 
my research on the future generations and our concern for them. 
My study is from the perspective of environmental ethics and the 
essay follows the line of preservation of the environment for all the 
generations as a whole.  
Further the presently existing individuals believe that there can be 
no possible conflict between the demands of the present and the 
future generations because the presently non-existing future 
population cannot demand anything from the present generation 
owing to the fact that “they” (future generation) are presently non-
existent in the current scenario. 
The question which carries a lot of weight in this field of research 
can be formulated in the following way: 
In reality do we owe anything to our future generations?  
The varied perspectives of philosophers in this area and the 
arguments forwarded by them in support of their respective stand 
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points gives us a vision of the many folded understanding of the 
relationship between the existing and the coming generations.  
My findings in this essay will be based on four main questions. 
They are as follows: 
 Whether the human beings ought to have any sort of 
concern for the future generations (specifically distant 
future generations) 
 If they have any sort of concern at all for the future 
generations, then what is the justification behind this 
concern? 
 Do “we” (present generation) need to be concerned for the 
non-human future generations? If “yes” then why should 
we be concerned for them? 
 How does belief in the doctrine of kamma impact the 
concern for the future generations? 
Section 1: Communitarian Approach 
Robert Elliot deals with the future generations and argues that the 
future generations can be equally holders of rights like the present 
generation.2  Elliot claims that the future generations are right 
holders and their absence in the present scenario does not justify 
the fact of not giving any rights to them. Elliot further believes that 
the rights which the future generations hold are contingent by 
nature. 3The contingency of the rights belonging to the future 
generations is based on the non-existence of the future individuals 
within the present scenario. All that the present generation can 
believe upon is the probable claim that some times ahead in the 
future life the future generations are going to exist. 
Avner De Shalit, in his paper named, “Community and the Rights 
of Future Generations: A Reply to Robert Elliot”, agrees with Elliot 
over the point that the future generations do have rights. Although 
                                                          
2 Robert, Elliot. „The Rights of Future People‟. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
6(2), pp. 159. 
3 Ibid., pp. 161. 




there is a very basic difference in both their approaches (De Shallit 
and Elliot‟s approach).4 Elliot„s claim regarding the rights for the 
future generations is solely based on Human Rights. De Shalit 
disagrees with Elliot over the respective point that the rights of the 
future generations can be totally grounded upon human rights. 
According to De Shalit there has to be something more than certain 
man-made set of rules which can act as an intergenerational 
linkage. In this context he has talked about the building up of the 
communitarian bondage between separate, discrete generations. 
This simply means that the present generation needs to feel that the 
future generations (who are presently non-existent at the moment) 
are a part of the community to which “they” (present generation) 
themselves belong. 
I am devoting an entire section of my essay to the communitarian 
approach to the future generations (De Shalit) because I feel that by 
following the communitarian approach towards the future 
generations the harmony between the present and the future 
generations is best maintained. 
In this section I will be primarily dealing with the Communitarian 
theory of Intergenerational Justice from the perspective of Avner 
De Shalit. This section is based on two works by De Shalit, namely: 
 Why Posterity Matters 
 „Community and the Rights of Future Generations‟, from 
the Journal of Applied Philosophy. 
De Shalit opines that “we”, present generations have certain 
obligations towards the future generations which can be primarily 
divided into positive and negative obligations.5 By positive 
obligations, he means those obligations which the present 
generation has towards the future generations in supplying them 
with all the necessary goods. By “necessary goods” he intends to 
include those goods which the present generation believes that the 
future generations will not be able to survive without. “Air” (to 
breath) is one such necessity for the future generations of all. While 
                                                          
4 Avner de, Shalit. „Community and the Rights of Future Generations: A 
Reply to Robert Elliot‟. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9(1), pp. 105. 
5 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp.13. 
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the negative obligations, according to De Shalit‟s view point is the 
obligation of the present generation to do no harm to the future 
generations. If the present generation cannot or rather does not 
intend to do any welfare to the future generations none of their 
present acts should in any way be the cause of any misery in the 
lives of the future generations. 
I feel it is a matter of choice for the present generation, whether 
they want to plant a tree or not, but the present generation should 
not cut down a tree planted by someone else.6 Technically speaking 
the present generation should not be reducing the oxygen level of 
the environment where the future generations are going to live 
their lives (sometimes in the future). 
De Shalit believes that the principles justifying the inter-
generational justice should fall within the scope of imagination and 
reasoning faculty of an individual.7 De Shalit feels that a reasonable 
justification is important within the communitarian approach on 
account of the fact that the concept of the intergenerational 
relationship itself is a complex matter to be borne by an individual 
mind.  
The communitarian approach towards the intergenerational justice 
is based on the idea of a community, which is not limited within a 
particular generation. The intergenerational community stretches 
its boundaries not only to the immediate future generation but also 
the distant future generations are included within the 
intergenerational community. This community which is not 
temporally bound is known as the Transgenerational community 
(by De Shalit).8 The not-yet born future individuals are also 
considered as a member of the transgenerational community. De 
Shalit says that the only criterion for the membership of a 
transgenerational community is that the being concerned (who will 
be considered as a member of the trans-generational community) 
should be free by nature, and should have an active rational 
                                                          
6 This example came to my mind from the ideas of positive and negative 
duties mentioned by Robin Attfield in his book, Environmental Ethics, 
pp.99. 
7 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp.14. 
8. Ibid., pp.14 




agency, which can help the individual (belonging to the present 
generation) in  the (normative) decision making procedures. The 
active rational faculty of the respective individual is a “normative 
requirement”, according to De Shalit‟s opinion.9 Although, De 
Shalit does not intend to say that the obligation of the present 
generation towards the future generations is based on the 
membership of the respective present generation to the 
transgenerational community.  
The following quotation will shed some light on the basis of the 
obligation of the present generation towards the future generation, 
in De Shalit‟s view point: 
“I am claiming here that the constitutive community extends over 
several generations and into the future, and that just as many 
people think of the past as part of their „selves‟, they do and should 
regard the future as part of their „selves‟.”10 
De Shalit‟s idea of transgenerational community seems to be quite 
flexible by nature owing to the fact that its members are not bound 
by any rigid set of norms, which cannot change over time. In fact, 
the community members have got the full liberty of making 
alterations towards the norms governing them within the 
transgenerational community.11 
By the term “community” what De Shalit understands is the 
concept where in people who know each other in some way or the 
other share the communal relation with each other respectively.12 
In order to demonstrate the intergenerational relationship between 
distant generations, De Shalit cites counter arguments forwarded 
by Care and Golding for the existence of intergenerational 
communities, who feel that no intergenerational relationship is 
possible. Care opines that unless reciprocation between the two 
individuals belonging to the same community is possible, no 
amount of community bonding can develop between its members. 
                                                          
9 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matter, pp.16. 
10 Ibid. pp. 15-16. 
11Ibid, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 47-49. 
12Ibid, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 17. 
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Golding sheds some light on another reason behind why no 
transgenerational community can exist; Golding feels that the 
individuals who are members of separate generations lack a 
common life on account of the lack of moral interaction.13 
De Shalit on the other hand argues that the formation of a 
transgenerational community is a realistic venture. In support of 
this argument, he cites instances from human behavior which 
supports De Shalit‟s stand point.  
The present generation abides by different customs and norms 
followed by the past generations.14 This simply shows that present 
generation values the relationship which they have with their past 
generations and intend to preserve whatever they have inherited 
from the past. I believe that these indications hint that the temporal 
distantness between generations does not alter the sense of 
commonality which two separate generations have in their very 
core. On account of this sense of commonality there seems a high 
chance of existence of a transgenerational community which 
extends over generations.  
De Shalit believes that within the core of a transgenerational 
community lays continuity and succession. 15 Since the behavioral 
indications observed in human beings are not sufficient grounds 
for justifying the existence of a transgenerational community. The 
main question which needs to be addressed in the course of this 
discussion is as follows: 
What is the criterion for considering the group of individuals 
belonging to separate generations as part of one and the same 
transgenerational community? 
De Shalit‟s analysis of the relationship between generations is 
wholly based on the analysis of the human psyche. De Shalit 
believes that the one thing which the members of the 
intergenerational community needs to have in common amongst 
themselves is the commonness of the moral principles governing 
                                                          
13 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp.18-19. 
14 Ibid., Why Posterity Matters, pp. 43-44. 
15 Ibid., Why Posterity Matters, pp. 38-40. 




their lives.16 He is in support of a pluralistic coexistence of 
diversified moral perspectives and he does not claim the necessity 
of a unanimous set of principles universally governing the lives of 
all particulars.17 In case of moral conflicts (what I understood by 
analyzing De Shalit‟s stand on moral pluralism) the pluralistic 
approach towards the intergenerational relationship is already a 
step ahead towards harmonizing the trangenerational community 
and no amount of concrete solution is necessary.  
De Shalit says that the ideal portrait of a community can only be 
conceived when there is residence of moral similarity within it. In 
other words this moral similarity brings along with it a sense of 
oneness within the community. The base of the transgenerational 
community, as per conceived by De Shalit is made up of this moral 
similarity which can only be achieved by similarity in the natures, 
attitudes, values and norms of the members of the community. 
According to De Shalit, it is not expected that a contemporary 
thinker will be emotionally attached with his future generations 
rather it is a bit too much of an expectation from the present 
generation. Whereas De Shalit believes that the origin of the sense 
of belongingness within the transgenerationals lays elsewhere this 
sense of belongingness originates from the understanding of the 
contemporary transgenerationals about the entire idea of the 
transgenerational community and its members irrespective of the 
time gap in the occurrence of the present and the future 
transgenerationals. In fact if the decisions of the transgenerationals 
are entirely controlled by reasons there are chances that they 
entirely reject their fellow members. In that way, the constitutive 
nature of the transgenerational community will be under threat. 
The next problem which is encountered by De Shalit is related with 
the maintenance of the correct balance between the obligations to 
                                                          
16 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp.27. 
17  Here I have connected the ideas of John Hick supporting the existence 
of plurality of religions(in” Religious Pluralism”, Charles Taliaferro and 
Paul J. Griffiths eds., Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Blackwell, 2003.,) 
with the ideas of De Shalit based on which the concept of the 
transgenerational community stands, in Why Posterity Matters, pp. 25-27.  
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contemporaries and the obligations to the future generations 
respectively. What gets revealed in this way of finding the correct 
balance between the two sets of obligations is an important aspect 
of the moral similarity between the trangenerationals. Moral 
similarity has rationality in its very core, and the essence of a 
trangenerational community is its high level of rationality; thereby 
the rational aspect of the moral similarity has high importance in 
the concept of transgenerational community.18 
Section 2: Future Generations and Early Buddhism 
The Buddhist school of thought divides the kamma or volitional 
actions performed by an individual into the following three 
categories, namely: 
 Morally good actions (kusala kamma). 
 Morally evil actions (akusala kamma). 
 Morally neutral actions (avyakta kamma).19 
 Moreover, the consequence of the kamma performed by an 
individual does not remain limited within the present life of the 
performer. The Buddhist Kamma Theory relates the presently 
performed intentional acts of an individual with the condition of 
the respective being in his future life. The nature of the kamma 
performed by an individual is the cause behind the condition of an 
individual in his next life. The Culakammavibhanga Sutta, from the 
Majjhima Nikaya, also demonstrates the reason behind the 
differences between individuals belonging to the same generation 
itself. The reason lies nowhere else other than the negative deeds 
(akusala kamma) performed by an individual in his previous birth. 
Hence if we look around us we will be able to find out individuals 
who are high born, low born; ugly, beautiful etc. and relate these 
seen differences to the Buddhist theory of kamma respectively. 
If excessive amount of negative energy is produced by the 
intentional acts of an individual in his present life, then in his next 
birth, on account of his past misdeeds, he will be reborn in a realm, 
                                                          
18 Avner De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 28-29. 
19 K.N Jayatilleka, Survival and Karma in Buddhist Perspective, pp.3. 




which is situated below the human realm and henceforth will be 
subject to miserable living conditions (In the Buddhist school of 
thought rebirth of an individual being is accepted.). I have 
described the realms below, following the Buddhist interpretation 
of the theory of kamma.  
There are 6 realms described in the Buddhist Theory of kamma.20 
They are as follows: God, Human, Hungry ghost, Titan, Animal, 
Hell beings 
An action performed by an individual produces some energy 
(negative or positive). This energy created by the kamma of an 
individual does not get used up unless it shows its impact on the 
being in his next life. 
So what we can infer from the above discussion related with theory 
of kamma from the Buddhist perspective: The one belonging to the 
present generation will concern for the future generations if and 
only if he is concerned about himself. In other words the individual 
who does not want to lead a miserable life in his next birth (which 
will be located below the human realm) has to stop himself from 
performing akusala kamma (morally evil actions) in his present life. 
The future person gets linked to me by means of the dispositional 
habits created by me in my present life.  The Future life of mine 
gets affected by the energy dissipated by the presently performed 
intentional acts of mine. The Theory of Conservation of Energy 
states that energy can neither be created nor be destroyed can be 
related with the Buddhist interpretation of the theory of kamma. 
The energy which my presently performed volitional acts create 
cannot be destroyed. This energy created by me, in my present life 
can be both positive and negative and henceforth the effectuation 
of this created energy in the future life is solely dependent on my 
present activities. Therefore it is me who is going to decide my 
future location in a respective realm.  
                                                          
20 James P. McDermott, “Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism”, Karma 
and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition. These five realms are listed in the 
Digha Nikaya (D) 3.254 etc. and the sixth category is mentioned in (D 
3.264). 
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De Shalit‟s communitarian approach, reminds me of the Theory of 
kamma. I believe that the obligations which the contemporary 
generations have towards the future generations can be well 
interpreted by the working of the kammic principles respectively. In 
fact, based on my understanding of De Shalit‟s arguments, 
forwarded by him within the section on Transgenerational 
communities, what I felt is that he himself (implicitly) believes that 
the actions of a presently existing individual is deeply related with 
his past and present lives.    (Although, De Shalit might not have 
intentionally related his arguments with the Buddhist doctrine of 
kamma.). 
I will come to a closure of this short accounting on the concern for 
the future generations by reminding my readers an essential part of 
our lives: The present generation cannot afford to forget that the 
resources which the present generation is utilizing at the present 
moment does not belong entirely to them. Moreover I strongly feel 
that doctrine of kamma (viewed from the early Buddhist 
perspective) can act as a strong ground to justify the concern for the 
future generations. 
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